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Compliance and defiance to national integration in Barotseland and Casamance¹

Abstract

What determines whether peripheral regions in Africa comply with the national integration project? Why do some regional elites, outside the core "fusion of elites", willingly partake in the state while others promote separate paths for their communities? This paper suggests some answers, based on a comparison between Barotseland—where the Lozi leadership has chosen not to challenge the Zambian project—and Casamance—where local particularism has resulted in active separatist defiance towards the Senegalese state among many Diola elites. It argues that the contrast between the two regions is more apparent than real, and that elites in both cases strive for access to the local benefits of sovereign statehood. Provided they can use the post-colonial state in their local strategies of domination and access to resources, regional elites are unlikely to challenge it, even if they are kept at a distance from resource-sharing arrangements at the national level. A broader model of African state formation, including the benefits of sovereignty for local elites, is needed to make sense of the resilience of African states and of the compliance of loser groups with their authority.

Keywords
elites, separatism, autonomy, state building. Senegal, Zambia

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Introduction

The extent to which African states have avoided significant territorial reconfigurations since their independence is puzzling. Not only does Eritrea represent the only ever successful secession in Africa, but there have actually been significantly fewer attempts at secession across the continent since 1960 than in any other region of the world except Latin America, despite the youth of African states (Englebert and Hummel 2005). In short, Africans seem disinclined to challenge post-colonial territoriality. Such an attitude of "territorial nationalism" (Young 2002) may well have made sense in the developmental phase of African nation-building throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when the state was a credible instrument of redistribution of the benefits of development (Boone 2004), but it is harder to fathom since the economic crisis that began in the late 1970s and has yet to abate. African states continue to extract significant resources from their populations, yet have little to return to them. It may still be rational for some groups, at the core of the post-colonial "fusion of elites", to reproduce the state from which their elites disproportionately benefit. Yet, the bankruptcy of the state should reduce the numbers of these groups, as budget-constrained governments increasingly focus on their immediate supporters only, at the cost of political instability and social polarization, as illustrated by Côte d'Ivoire, for example, since the rise of the Bédié regime and even more so after the ascent of Laurent Gbagbo to the presidency. If anything, the use by such cash-strapped governments of restrictive notions of citizenship and nationality in order to exclude certain groups from the benefits of statehood could be expected to promote territorial challenges to the state by the marginalized groups.

The preservation of the state is not prima facie a maximizing strategy for the increasing number of peripheral communities at the margins of the hegemonic bloc that underwrites post-colonial power configurations. More often than not, these groups have not reaped significant benefits from their integration into the state, and they have sometimes been persecuted at its hands. Often, too, they lie at the territorial edges of weak states and could conceivably make claims for autonomy that central governments would be hard put to challenge. One would expect the wide dispersion of natural resources in

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2 Richard L. Sklar (1963:474-512, 1979) introduced the concept of "fusion of elites" to explain social class formation in Nigeria and, more generally, tropical Africa. The notion has also been used by John Lonsdale (1981) and, with some modifications, by Jean-François Bayart (1985, 1993), who labels it "reciprocal assimilation of elites," and Catherine Boone (1994, 2003). My argument in this paper relies on Bayart and Boone's usage of it as an instrument of the reproduction of the state.

3 See also Africa Confidential (2004) for an example of fusion shrinkage in the Republic of Congo.
Africa to frequently support such exit strategies. Yet, despite some vocal opponents here and there who generally fail to translate their discourses into meaningful political mobilization, very few African marginalized peripheral groups actually promote separatist paths of development. Since the early 1990s, an exhaustive list of African secessionist movements includes only Casamance in Senegal, Southern Sudan, the Tuaregs of Niger and Mali, Cabinda in Angola, several regions of Ethiopia, and the Somaliland Republic. In contrast, numerous dominated or excluded regions, such as the DR Congo’s Kivu, Kasai and Katanga provinces, Congo-Brazzaville’s southern region, South Africa’s Zululand, Côte d’Ivoire’s north, Nigeria’s Delta, Angola’s Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, Zambia’s Western Province, Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland, Cameroon’s Anglophone Western region, and so forth, have failed to make significant separatist demands.4

This paper addresses this apparent paradox by comparing the recent trajectories of two peripheral regions: Zambia’s Barotseland (Western Province), and the Casamance region of Senegal. These two regions differ from each other in their degree of compliance with the post-colonial nation-building project.5 Although both regions have been historically neglected or exploited by the central state, the Barotse Royal Establishment does not openly challenge the Lusaka government and represses claims for autonomy in its midst, while a significant portion of Casamance elites have waged a violent struggle for secession against the Senegalese state since 1982 (and more so since 1990), which successive administrations have so far failed to bring to an effective end. By comparing these two different responses from regional elites in similar historical situations, the paper draws attention to the importance of access to local benefits of sovereignty by these elites in determining the decision to comply with or defy the post-colonial state. More than sharing the resources of neopatrimonial politics, access to sovereignty allows local elites to exert their domination over, and extract resources from, local populations. Although broadly unintegrated in the postcolonial contract, Bartose elites have managed to use elements of state sovereignty to reinforce

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4 There have been groups with separatist agendas in some of these regions, such as the South Cameroons National Council (SCNC) in Anglophone Cameroon, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in Nigeria or the Caprivi Liberation Army in Namibia, but they have fallen short of a minimum threshold of mobilization and political violence to be credible. From this perspective, many of the instances of “subnationalism” identified by Joshua Forrest (2004) represent less of a challenge to existing state structures than he seems to imply.

5 Although, as argued by Crawford Young (2004), many dimensions of their colonial ancestors no longer apply to contemporary African states, the preservation of the colonially defined territories suggests some lasting conceptual validity to the notion of post-colonial statehood.
their local domination and have therefore accepted their own marginalization within Zambia, albeit sometimes reluctantly. In contrast, cultural and historical factors have made it all but impossible for Casamance elites to benefit from local state institutions. As a result, they have resorted to violence to both establish themselves as credible elites and seek access to local state authority. The paper argues, therefore, that while prevailing models of the pursuit of hegemony by regional groups over the postcolonial state as a whole (e.g., Bayart 1993) explain the compliance of relatively dominant groups with the postcolonial project, one needs to look at the derivative uses of sovereignty in the reproduction of their local hegemony by peripheral regional elites in order to understand their lack of defiance to the postcolony. In other words, possibilities for local domination and exploitation (i.e., within a region or ethnic group) account in part for the nationalist outlook of local elites.

The next section provides a brief overview of the similarities between Barotseland and Casamance. The paper then turns to a comparative analysis of separatist activism in both regions, particularly since 1990, before offering a theory of separatist variance as a function of access by local elites to the benefits of sovereignty (even in the absence of formal fusion with state elites). This argument is then compared to alternative theories and its implications with respect to the resilience of Africa’s weak states are discussed in the conclusion.

**Similarities among Barotseland and Casamance**

Although they were respectively colonized by Britain and France and lie at opposite ends of the continent, the historical patterns of relation, contemporary grievances, and modes of integration of Casamance and Barotseland vis-à-vis Senegal and Zambia are stunningly similar. Both regions had ambiguously distinct colonial pasts; both are peripheral border areas physically isolated from the center; both are culturally different; both have “nationals” in neighboring countries; both believe they have significant natural resources and perceive to have been economically neglected, if not exploited, by the central state.

Historical differences constitute a dominant motive in the self-perceptions of both regions. Barotseland was a British protectorate, which gave it greater autonomy and a milder form of colonialism than the rest of Northern Rhodesia with which it was administratively associated (Caplan 1970:38-73; Hall 1965:54-86). In 1961, the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) had even sent representatives to Britain to seek separate independence for Barotseland, but they were turned down. While not a protectorate, Casamance was administered separately from the rest of Senegal from 1854 to 1939, under direct authority of the governor of French West Africa, and only
integrated with it towards the end of the colonial period (Charpy 1994; Beck 1999:5). As a result, both regions entertain today an idea of historical distinctiveness. The BRE is of the opinion that its integration into Zambia was the consequence of an international treaty, the Barotseland Agreement (BLA) of 1964, which was wrongfully later abrogated by the Zambian constitution (Barotse National Conference 1995). Casamance leader Diamacoune Senghor, for his part, likes to repeat that his is not a struggle for separatism from Senegal but for the „right to independence“ of his country, Casamance (Diaw & Diouf, 1998:268).

Physically, both regions are remote. Barotseland lies about 600km west of Lusaka, in what is now the Western Province. A sandy offshoot of the Kalahari Desert anchored around the floodplains of the Zambezi River, its geography differs radically from the rest of Zambia. Casamance is virtually partitioned from the rest of Senegal by Gambia, with road traffic forced to cross two international borders (and board a ferry) between Dakar and Ziguinchor, the region’s capital, or to make a long detour east around Gambia. Both regions are also populated by groups, the Lozi and the Diola, who straddle the local borders into neighboring countries.

Culturally, although both regions differ greatly in terms of their political traditions, they are similar in their outcast status and different types of political organization from the rest of the country. The Lozi have a well-developed cultural and political identity, with a documented history dating back to around 1700. There have been 22 kings (litunga), ruling over a hierarchical structure of power that includes a royal council (kuta) and a prime minister (ngambela). The kingdom is divided into seven districts, each similarly organized and divided in turn into counties and villages. This system has remained functional. The kuta in the capital, Limulunga, meets regularly to hear cases brought to it from the smallest village upwards, including land disputes, matrimonial matters and problems of witchcraft (Manyando interview, 2003). Casamance, for its part, is mainly composed of Diola populations who have a traditionally stateless culture and little historical exposure to Islam and the Marabout hierarchies, in contrast to the rest of Senegal. In addition, both the Lozi and the Diola are at significant cultural distance from the traditionally dominant group in their country (respectively the Bemba and the Wolof), making co-optation politics harder to implement.

Materially, both regions suffer from perceived and actual grievances. The Western Province in one of Zambia’s poorest and its reliance on maize monocropping and donations from the World Food Program makes it vulnerable to food insecurity (Ellyne interview, 2003). Large portions of its territory are frequently inundated and its people displaced. The province counts about 620,000 people, more than 80% of whom live on less than $1 a day (Boston Globe 2003). There is virtually no formal employment. Casamance may not be so poor but remains largely outside the state-sponsored mechanisms of distri-
bution of wealth. Its 800,000 inhabitants benefit little from the region’s tourism industry and their reliance on the cultivation of peanuts has suffered from the consequences of the conflict. Both regions have also seen their control over local land challenged by state policies. In Zambia, the Chiluba government adopted a land reform in 1995, which formally took away the litunga’s prerogatives in allocating land to his subjects. In Casamance, many locals saw their land expropriated to the benefit of northern Wolof migrants in the early 1980s. Finally, residents of both regions feel economically neglected or abandoned by the rest of the country while remaining confident that they are sitting atop numerous unexploited riches, such as diamonds (Barotseland) and oil (both). They blame the state for under-investing in their region and keeping them away from profitable state employment.

In conclusion, both Barotseland and Casamance are peripheral, largely unintegrated communities that have failed to benefit from the post-colonial social contract. Barotseland has been kept outside winning coalitions in Zambia, both under single party rule and since the democratic reforms of the early 1990s, with the Bemba and copperbelt communities providing the foundations to successive regimes. In Senegal, Casamance has been kept outside the “power-sharing” structure of the Wolof groundnut basin and has been integrated in the state through “administrative occupation” (Boone 2003). As a result, these two regions have developed sufficient grievance to justify challenging the nature of their integration to the state.

Separatism in Barotseland and Casamance

While the two regions share many similarities, they diverge in their compliance with the national integration agenda. Barotseland by and large accepts its Zambian identity while Casamance has been the stage of a separatist conflict for more than 20 years. In this section, I offer brief reviews of the relations of both regions with the center since the early 1990s. Although the Casamance conflict dates back to 1982, I focus mainly on the post-Cold-War period to the extent that it overlaps in each country with a greater fiscal crisis and relative democratization, both of which are likely to increase the neglect of marginalized peripheries and magnify their potential for defiance.

Barotseland

To be sure, separatism has not been altogether absent from political discourse in Barotseland. Yet, no group to this day has taken arms in support of the separatist agenda, and Barotse elites, embodied in the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE), have generally rejected secession as a political objective, in
exchange for promises of local autonomy. In 1964, Litunga Mwanawina Lewanika III signed the Barotseland Agreement (BLA) on behalf of his region, which provided the legal basis for the integration of Barotseland within Zambia. According to the BLA, while Northern Rhodesia „should proceed to independence as one country,” the litunga of Barotseland would continue to be recognized „as such” by the Zambian government and remain „the principal local authority for the government and administration of Barotseland,” being empowered to make laws for his region in several matters, including matters relating to local courts and government, land, forest, fishing, hunting, game preservation, the Barotse Native Treasury, the reservation of trees for canoes (a crucial resource in the floodplains) and, of all things, the „supply of beer.” Several prominent Lozi elites, including the Wina brothers, Arthur and Sikota (whose father had been Ngambela), Munukayumbwa Sipalo and Nalumo Mulundia later joined the administration of Kenneth Kaunda (Pitch 1967; Caplan 1970).

The arrangements of the BLA were not to last, however, and the Lusaka government rapidly attempted to impose central control over the province. The shift to a single party system and the adoption by referendum of a new constitution in 1969 provided the context for President Kaunda’s rescinding of the Agreement and conversion of Barotseland into a mere province. As Lozi Princess Nakatindi Wina, now a member of the opposition United National Independence Party (UNIP), put it in 1968, „When the rest of the world is getting together, when great nations are joining up in the United Nations, how can little Barotse hope to survive by herself?” Aside from some vocal opposition by local elites, no significant resistance developed against this dissolution despite the fact that the BRE authorities remained largely outside the fusion of Zambian elites until the appointment of Litunga Inyambo Yeta IV to the Central Committee of UNIP in 1988, when winds of change threatened the Kaunda regime.

With democratization in the 1990s, Lozi demands for autonomy resurfaced but did not exceed the restoration of the BLA. In the 1991 multi-party elections, the Lozi voted overwhelmingly for the opposition Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in the hope that it would look more favorably upon the restoration of their autonomy (even though Kaunda had belatedly agreed that year to re-examine Lozi grievances if reelected [Information Day 1992]). Yet, the MMD and its president, Frederick Chiluba, turned out to be

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6 I overlook here the pro-separatist attitude of the BRE in the early 1960s, especially that of Litunga Mwanawina Lewanika III who wanted secession of Barotseland in 1961 as Zambia approached independence. Nothing came of it and the Barotse leadership, even then, declined to forcibly challenge its region’s integration into Zambia.

rather unsympathetic to the Lozi agenda and adopted policies that were seen as favoring the president's Bemba group. After two years of misunderstandings and stalling by the Chiluba administration, a group of 5,000 Barotse royals gathered in the kingdom's capital, Limulunga, on a Saturday in July 1993, and called for the province's secession through the courts (Daily Mail 1993). President Chiluba reacted sharply, promising to crush any uprising (Zambia Times 1993).

These events marked the beginning of a sharp rise in tension between the government and the BRE, which peaked in 1995. Throughout this period, however, the BRE continued to publicly reject the secessionist option (while claiming that Barotseland nevertheless had a right to it) and to dissociate itself from the most „loyalists“ in its fold. In 1994, for example, Litunga Ilute Yeta reiterated that „We shall not secede from Zambia“ while simultaneously expressing his grievance at the government for its „perpetual enslavement“ of his region (The Post 1994). Later that year, Chiluba's motorcade was stoned upon a visit to Mongu, the capital of the Western Province and a mere few kilometers from Limulunga. The following month, fearful that the government would retaliate against the litunga, locals raised a temporary „army“ of some 3,000 Lozi to protect their king, an act that was deemed treasonable by the government. Things got even worse when police seized rocket launchers and other weapons in the province, including anti-aircraft guns, explosives, hand grenades, and land mines, all of which were believed to have been exchanged for food with UNITA in neighboring Angola (Minorities at Risk 2003). In 1995, relations further deteriorated when the government passed a new Land Act, which vested the allocation of public lands into the presidency, removing from the litunga a prerogative he had hitherto enjoyed in the Western Province (despite its formal repeal with the abrogation of the BLA). In early November of that year, the BRE made its strongest ever public pronouncement on the issue of national integration in the „Resolutions of the Barotseland National Conference,“ held at Lealui. Signed by the Ngambela, the resolutions stressed Barotse's dejection at the government's refusal to recognize the BLA, accused it of deceit and of „total abrogation of the rights of the people of Barotseland,“ before resolving that the recognition of the BLA by the government „must be incorporated in the constitution.“ Furthermore, „if the government continues to be obstinate, the people of the Barotse shall have the right to self-determination by reverting to the original status of Barotseland before 1964,“ which is the closest thing to a threat of secessionism that

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8 Lealui, which lies in the floodplains a few kilometers from Mongu, is the official residence of the Litunga and seat of the kingdom when the plains are not flooded. During the rainy season, the kingdom's capital moves to Limulunga (in the Kuomboka ceremony), equally close to Mongu but above the plains.
the BRE ever ushered, if one neglects the fact that Barotseland was a British protectorate before 1964 (Office of the Ngambela 1995). It would also be the last such threat on the part of the BRE. Although the government did not bulge with respect to the BLA, the implementation of the Land Act remained superficial and did not significantly undermine the de facto local powers of the litunga. While the BRE did not demure from its demands for the restoration of BLA (with the litunga even taking a trip to London in 1997 to seek British support on the issue), it did not either again challenge the state head on. Most of the quasi-separatist agitation that continued in the ensuing years was the work of Lozi elites who did not belong in the Barotse administration, though many of them actually were of royal line-age and may well have harbored ambitions for the litungaship.

Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika („Aka“) provides such an example. A son of the late Litunga Lewanika, he unsuccessfully competed for the litunga position upon the death of Ilute Yeta IV in 2000. A founding member of the MMD, he created his own party, Agenda for Zambia, in 1996, which promoted a separatist platform, before rejoining the MMD after the election of Levy Mwanawasa to the presidency in 2001 and becoming party spokesperson, after which he publicly abandoned his activism on behalf of secession. Prince Imasiku Mutangelwa is another case in point. After a life mostly spent abroad, he returned to Zambia in 1991 and founded the Barotse Cultural Association (BCA) in 1992 and the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF) in 1996, which is the most radical of the Lozi movements, having threatened military conflict in 1998 if Zambia did not grant Barotseland secession (Mutangelwa interview, 2003). Suffering from government harassment, he sought refuge at the South African High Commission in August 1999 before being arrested upon leaving and charged with „belonging to an unregistered organization“ in September. He pleaded not guilty and was released on bail. At the time of writing (November 2004), he was still awaiting trial. Other separatist events included the arrest of the opposition UNIP vice-president, Inyambo Yeta, on suspicion of involvement in a bombing campaign claimed by a group called Black Mamba. There was also an alleged failed coup attempt in October 1997 by Princess Nakatindi Wina, the then MMD Chair for Women’s Affair, who was later arrested (Minorities at Risk 2003).

Pro-restoration activism tapered down after the election of Levy Mwanawasa to the presidency in 2001, in part because of the closer cultural links that the Lozi experience with Mwanawasa’s Lenje (a Tonga sub-group) than with Chiluba’s Bemba. It should be stressed, however, that no group ever took violent action in favor of separatism (unlike Lozi activists in the Caprivi Strip of neighboring Namibia who attacked a government garrison in Katima Mulilo in August 1999). Furthermore, the Barotse Royal Establishment itself stayed away from separatist claims, despite being extremely explicit about its grievances vis-à-vis the Zambian state. Over and over again,
though systematically ignored or rebuffed, the BRE has continued to focus on the restoration of the BLA as its only demand, and has been quite able to live without this wish being fulfilled. This contrasts with the agenda of their Casamance counterparts.

**Casamance**

Unlike Barotseland, Casamance has been the stage of a violent separatist rebellion since 1982, under the leadership of the „Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance“ (MFDC). The MFDC, founded in 1947 by Emile Badiane, was not originally a separatist party and was dissolved into the state after Senegal’s independence in 1960. Many Casamançais believe, however, that there was a secret agreement between Badiane and President Léopold Senghor for granting Casamance its own independence after 20 years of Senegalese self-rule, although there is no evidence for this claim. In 1982, the MFDC was revived by Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Ziguinchor-based Catholic priest, teacher and organizer of youth movements who had published a pamphlet of Casamance grievances in 1978. It is generally argued that the conflict erupted as a consequence of increased land expropriations by northerners, the change of regime from Senghor (a Serer) to Abdou Diouf (a Wolof), economic disaffection of the region, and an increased sense of local identity paradoxically derived from education, migration, tourism and the discourse of the Catholic Church (see Beck 1999; Diouf 1998; Foucher 2002; Gasser 2002; and Marut 2002). On 26 December 1982, the MFDC organized a march for independence in the regional capital, Ziguinchor. The state reacted violently, arresting many demonstrators while others were killed. Diamacoune had been arrested before the march and sentenced to 5 years. There were subsequently more demonstrations and repressive actions by the state, including government military attacks into „sacred woods“ where Diolas perform ritual ceremonies, which increased cultural resentment against Senegal. It is in these same forests that the MFDC’s military wing, „Atika“ (warrior), was created in 1985 under the leadership of Sidy Badji, a French army veteran.9

The conflict’s intensity remained low until 1989 when the availability of weapons improved. The MFDC launched an offensive in June 1990 and, by September of that year, the government had appointed a military governor for the province. After the government agreed to release some 300 MFDC members in May 1991, a first cease-fire was concluded in Cacheu, Guinea-Bissau, and signed by Sidy Badji on behalf of the MFDC. The military governor was replaced by a civilian in June and an amnesty was extended to many

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9 I am grateful to Vincent Foucher for all biographical information on MFDC leadership.
Casamançais. This was to be the first of a long cycle of alternating violence and failed cease-fires while also marking the beginnings of a substantial factionalism problem among the MFDC leadership, which has made it extremely hard to this day for the government to identify credible negotiating partners among the rebels.

Badji’s cease-fire challenged the authority of the MFDC’s Central Bureau and triggered a split in its military command. Badji’s group, which became known as the Northern Front, laid down their arms while settling in the Bignona region from where it engaged in economic activities largely beyond government control while benefiting from the proximity of Gambia. Léopold Sagna and Salif Sadio took over the leadership of the Southern Front of the Maquis, which refused to recognize the cease-fire. Sagna, a former Senegalese soldier, had been Badji’s deputy chief; Sadio, a school drop-out, Atika’s chief of operations. The Northern Front renounced the pursuit of independence while the Southern Front, more Diola, more Catholic, and based mainly along the border with Guinea-Bissau, remained committed to the armed struggle in order to achieve the MFDC’s aims. Diamacoune aligned with the Southern Front and violence flared up again in the south in 1992, including attacks in October near the Cap Skirring tourist resort that included the deliberate killings of northerners. In December the Senegalese army launched air attacks on supposed rebel bases along the border with Guinea-Bissau. That year, Diamacoune also declared himself Secretary General of the MFDC and appointed Mamadou Sane Nkrumah, an exile in France, as his deputy.

By 1993, which saw the re-election of Abdou Diouf to the presidency, there were 5,000 Senegalese soldiers, one third of the national army, in Casamance (Villalon 2000: B146). After another short-lived cease-fire and bloody clashes, Diamacoune made his first public appeal for peace that same year. He signed a cease-fire in July, which held by and large until 1995. In December 1993, France, which had been asked for a testimony, declared that there was no historical evidence supporting the claim of independence of Casamance by the MFDC. This was a serious blow to the MFDC’s ideology of separate colonial legacies. More advantageous to the MFDC was the takeover of Yahya Jammeh, a Diola with MFDC links, in neighboring Gambia in July 1994.

1995 marked another year of escalating violence. After four French tourists disappeared in Basse-Casamance in April, Diamacoune was placed under house arrest. In June, the MFDC announced the end of the 1993 cease-fire. In November, Nkrumah stated that the MFDC was willing to negotiate if Diamacoune and others were released from house arrest. The next month, Diamacoune appealed to his men to disarm, but to no avail. On the contrary, from 1995 to 1997 the Southern Front began a new strategy of occupying different economically advantageous areas and spreading violence beyond Ziguinchor and the south. A large army operation in late 1997 resulted in a
generalization of warfare across the region, including the hitherto pacified zone of Bignona. At the same time, divisions intensified among the leaders of the southern front, with Sadio replacing Sagna after the latter had met with President Diouf (Sagna is believed to have been killed upon his return). Diamacoune, who continued to publicly support Sagna over Sadio, also appeared increasingly disconnected from his movement's armed wing (Humphreys and Mohamed 2003:14).

In January 1998, Diamacoune made another appeal for peace and made clear that he was ready to give up independence demand in exchange for better economic and social development in Casamance. He created a Provisional Steering Committee with Badji in October 1998 in a bid to overcome internal MFDC divisions. Attempts at unity continued in 1999 with a meeting of some 150 delegates of several MFDC factions in Banjul in April, but without the Southern Front military leaders and Nkrumah from the external branch. The meeting reconducted Diamacoune as leader and voted to negotiate with Dakar. No demand for independence appeared in the final communiqué. This seemed to mark a turn in the MFDC's agenda towards greater willingness of co-optation with the state, leading to a new cease-fire in December 1999 and an agreement in January 2000 to hold monthly meetings to set up mechanisms for monitoring the cessation of hostilities. This came at the price of greater divisions within the movement, however, as illustrated by the firing in January of Nkrumah Sane as the movement's spokesperson in Paris, and by an increasing schism between Diamacoune and his military commanders, Salif Sadio and Leopold Sagna.

Things appeared to change at the national level when Abdoulaye Wade was elected president in March 2000. Wade introduced a new strategy of "direct discussions" with MFDC (Humphreys and Mohamed 2003:15; Foucher 2003) and limited the roles of neighboring Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in the conflict. In 2001, a "provisional peace agreement" was signed between the government and Diamacoune, in which the MFDC moved further away from separatist demands and asked for better investment and support from Dakar (African Times, 15 September 2002). Yet, continued confusion among the MFDC leadership undermined whatever agreement the government was able to extract from some of its leaders, with Diamacoune and Badji fighting over the leadership for more than a year. In January 2003, in a significant shift, Diamacoune publicly asked his supporters to move away from the demand for independence. In May of that year, in between meetings for the reconciliation of MFDC factions, Sidy Badji died of cancer, postponing further negotiations.

From the government's perspective, the period since the Wade takeover has witnessed some improvements, especially in the toning down of the movement's demands as expressed by Diamacoune. Yet, continued divisions among the movement have made it hard for such evolution to translate into a sustained attenuation of the conflict as the MFDC's Southern Front military
wing increasingly appears as a free agent from the movement's civilian leadership. In the end, as Foucher (2003) argues, changes under Wade have been more limited than expected and owe more to changing international circumstances than to his new strategy.

Different strategies, same pursuit

Although Barotseland and Casamance differ in their separatist propensities, this section argues that their elites actually follow a similar pursuit of the local benefits of state sovereignty. What accounts for their different strategic choices is a function of the local nature of power and its relation to sovereign institutions. In Barotseland, the royal establishment's power over local populations and resources finds reinforcement in its recognition, however ambiguous, by the central state. Casamance political leaders, on the other hand, enjoy no traditional precedent for their claim to political control and do not benefit from institutional prebends from the state. These varying constraints result in different approaches—respectively compliance and defiance—to the national integration agenda of the state.

Barotseland

What is most stunning about Barotseland is the remarkable preservation of its "traditional" political structure, which has endured through the relative mildness of the British protectorate and neglect of the Kaunda regime. The Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) retains considerable power throughout the province, particularly in matters of land and natural resources. In the words of a Western aid worker involved in assistance projects in the province, "the Barotse Royal Establishment is a parallel system of government, with considerable powers over water, cattle, rice, and land resources" (anonymous aid worker interview 1, 2003). The kingdom also maintains a tight and hierarchical structure of authority, from the litunga and his council down to the village headmen, which accommodates little dissent and represents a still formidable instrument of hegemony over local populations. The Lozi depend indeed on the BRE for their access to land, but also for the adjudication of labor and family disputes, solutions to problems of sorcery, and access to state and international resources (Ngambela interview, 2003; anonymous aid worker interview 2, 2003). International organizations have to rely on the BRE to deliver goods and services to populations in the Zambezi floodplains, which further promotes the latter's local control. In addition, the authority of the king remains respected, and Lozi are disinclined to show disloyalty for him, even if they think he is wrong (Mbikusita-Lewanika interview, 2003). In the end, "you cannot do anything in the Western Province without the support of the BRE" (Watae interview, 2003).
This capacity of the BRE to exert its local hegemony is a crucial factor in understanding its attitude vis-à-vis national integration. As long as national integration does not threaten its local hegemony, the BRE is unlikely to demand a separate political trajectory from Zambia. If the state does not impede upon its local powers, it will not oppose the state. If it finds that association with the state can reinforce its local powers, then it will actively discourage separatist tendencies in its region. This is why the BRE’s demands have historically been limited to the restoration of the BLA. This insistence is not so much a matter of asserting the region’s particularism vis-à-vis the state as it is a means to increase the BRE’s power over its own people. Indeed, by formalizing its local prerogatives as deriving from an agreement with the sovereign internationally recognized state, the BLA crystallizes the BRE’s powers, conferring upon them the seal of legitimacy and stifling the rise of potential challenges. Hence, while it eschews the responsibilities of sovereign statehood (and can blame others for its province’s failures), the Lozi leadership benefits from resources associated with the sovereignty of Zambia. The only two times that the BRE called for separatism were in the early 1960s, when postcolonial norms of sovereignty were not yet well established, and in 1995, when President Chiluba tried to undermine their local hegemony by passing the Land Act which removed the power of land allocation from the litunga. As a former induna puts it, „with our land no longer ours, we got angry” (anonymous interview, 2003). This provided the context for the famous Lealui Resolutions of 1995. But, as the implementation of the Land Act steered away from truly undermining the litunga’s powers, tensions receded and the BRE abandoned its confrontational stance.

Control over land and resources is indeed the very foundation of the BRE’s powers. Litunga means land, and the litunga is deemed the owner of land, soil, cattle and animals (Mupatu interview, 2003). The power of giving land to people is a crucial element of the BRE’s capacity to maintain its local hegemony. In an era of modernization, and with potential competition from migrants and market forces, however, the BRE cannot merely rely on tradition for maintaining this role. It is the recognition of this role by the state which provides it with the sanction of sovereign force. This is why the BRE insists on the restoration of the BLA. For the government, however, the current ambiguous situation, in which laws depriving the BRE of its powers are not being implemented, is a superior outcome as it maintains the vulnerability of the BRE and provides for greater central control over local resources. Al-

10 On post-colonial norms of sovereignty, see Jackson (1990) and Herbst (2000).
11 As was probably the control over the supply of beer, which was also included in the BLA among the king’s prerogatives.
though not ideal, this half autonomy remains better for the BRE than the uncertainties and responsibilities of separatism.

The current arrangement allows the BRE to maintain some control over the sale of timber from the Western Province, for example, which is still allegedly stamped "Barotse Native Government" (a relic of the BLA) before being trucked to Lusaka. As long as it can continue to be recognized as having some degree of property over these resources and to derive income from their exploitation, the BRE is unlikely to promote any challenge to the state. This situation may even turn out to be more beneficial for the BRE than the formal recognition of the BLA as it seems to take place mostly as a private transaction for the litungaship, away from the rules of public accountability that would probably accompany a formal restoration of the BLA-asserted rights over local resources.

A recent scandal regarding the management of two local wildlife parks provides another case in point. In the summer of 2003, it was reported in national Zambian media that the BRE had concluded lease contracts with a South African firm for the management of the two national parks of the Western Province, Liuwa Plain National Park, north of Kalabo, and Sioma National Park, adjacent to the Caprivi strip and the Angolan border in the south. These leases were apparently concluded in collaboration with the Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), a national state agency. Although the national parks belong to the government, the BRE appears to have been in the driver's seat of this business deal, relying again on its residual and ambiguous powers over land issues (see The Post, 2003). There was resentment that the BRE did not represent the interests of the Lozi people in these negotiations, which appeared to have been undertaken on a mostly private basis. According to Princess Nakatindi Wina, a Lozi member of parliament and opponent of the BRE, the BRE charged K140,000 (about $30) for access to a workshop in Limulunga in May 2003 to discuss the matter, and forced local chiefs to acquiesce, essentially preventing any popular input in the process (Wina interview, 2003; The Post, 2003).

It should be noted that the benefits which the BRE derives from national integration are not those of the fusion or reciprocal assimilation of elites, nor of common patronage. The BRE is not provided with resources redistributed from the central state. It is merely allowed to exploit its own region's resources and people, and to do so with little or no public oversight, capitalizing partly on its traditional powers and on its recognition by the state as a legitimate local authority (in parallel with provincial authorities, which are

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12 Although I saw numerous logs awaiting transport along the Mongu-Lusaka road, I did not observe such marks and cannot independently confirm this story, despite near-systematic mention of this by interviewees in the Western Province.
supposed to provide other public goods such as education or infrastructure). The integration of Barotseland into Zambia favors thus the reproduction of the hegemony of the BRE over its people. Given these benefits, it would be irrational for the BRE to pursue a separatist strategy with the responsibilities of statehood, the increased public scrutiny and the possibilities of competition with other regional social forces or politicians. The only meaningful demand is for a restoration of the BLA which would not only increase the BRE’s control over local resources but also formalize its recognition as the legitimate provincial authority.

As a result, the continuation of the BRE’s local hegemony depends on the reproduction of the Zambian state, possibly at the expense of the social and economic development of the province. Zambia helps the Barotse elite in two ways. First, by recognizing it, it stifles the rise of local institutional alternatives and facilitates the litunga’s control over his own people and local resources, allowing the BRE to be run as the litunga’s private business and providing it with immunity to local demands. In the words of a Mongu businessman, “the government has neglected us. We have no roads, no development, no projects. But the BRE is not doing a good job either. There is much corruption in the BRE. They are only interested in their own welfare” (anonymous interview, 2003). Anti-BRE politician Sikota Wina echoes these sentiments: “the BRE is opposed to new ideas. It is a stronghold against the Western province. There is no encouragement of investments, even by successful Lozi, because it would weaken the power of the litunga” (Wina interview, 2003). Barotse elites appear thus to be retarding development. Because they are firmly entrenched in traditional rural relations (with power based on allocation of land), they prevent the rise of alternative economic powers based on private enterprise and freed from land relations. The central state offers them the means to resist these alternative forces, but at the possible cost of keeping their region underdeveloped. The BRE then paradoxically capitalizes on the Western Province’s underdevelopment, which nurtures popular grievances vis-à-vis the Zambian state and fosters a sense of local identity that reproduces the litunga’s political centrality.

Second, it reinforces local elites, particularly the litunga himself, by providing them with access to some material benefits. The litunga receives a salary from Lusaka, as do the country’s other “paramount chiefs.” In addition, as already illustrated, the litunga appears invested in several business ventures via the state, such as the exploitation of timber and the lease of national parks. These material benefits are significant as there are few other sources of income for the kingdom, except for levies from a couple of markets and tributes from subjects. The relative wealth of the litunga, even in comparison to his unpaid indunas, cannot fail to surprise the visitor to Limulunga. My notes from my first visit to the palace read as follows: “This is a poor kingdom, but a rich king. While waiting for the ngambela, I saw the
litunga leave the palace as people, myself including, kneeled down and clapped. He was wearing a fancy black suit and stepped into a shiny black 4-wheel-drive Sports Utility Vehicle. Meanwhile, his chief of protocol was barefoot and the indunas I met looked rather poor, as all else around here."

The argument of this section does not however purport to convey that there are no separatist Lozi elites. Imasiku Mutangelwa, royal prince and leader of the Barotse Patriotic Front, is a case in point. So was Akashambatwa Mbisusita-Lewanika (son of a former litunga) for most of the 1990s. Princess Nakatindi Wina and her husband Sikota provide more ambiguous cases as their position has fluctuated greatly over the years. Yet, what separates these elites from the BRE may depend largely on their status as outsiders, as well as their personal ambitions. Mutangelwa, for example, spent much of his adult life abroad until his return to Zambia in the early 1990s, at a time when democratization swept the continent and the self-determination agenda was on the rise in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. He met other Africans in London, who hailed from other former protectorates and belong now to independent nations. He returned home with initially reformist rather than separatist intentions: "We wanted to bring in new ideas, insert young generations as Indunas so that we would not be backwards. We wanted to modernize Barotseland. Our region has such great intellectuals, we had to improve over Limulunga. But the government always compromised the BRE. So we needed a more radical move. BPF was born in 1996 because we were frustrated with the compromises of the BRE” (Mutangelwa interview, 2003).

The case of Akashambatwa Mbisusita-Lewanika (Aka) may be more a function of personal ambition. He may have positioned himself throughout the 1990s as a credible successor to Litunga Ilute Yeta by embracing a separatist rhetoric. This may account for his creation of Agenda for Zambia (AZ), a pro-independence party, in 1996. But after Lubosi Imwiko II became litunga in 2000, Aka merged AZ into the ruling party MMD, of which he became the spokesperson. He explains his reversal by the fact that President Mwanawasa was more favorable to the Lozi agenda than his predecessor, which made it more likely for Barotseland to achieve some of its goals by collaborating with him (Mbikusita-Lewanika interview, 2003). The Winas, who are both opposition members of parliament, are discreet backers of the Barotse Patriotic Front, standing against both the government and the BRE, though they were high-ranking members of the MMD as recently as 1998. Their falling-out with the ruling party may have led them to both join the UNDP opposition party and to confront the BRE as it stands in relatively good terms with the government. Their support for the BPF may be therefore mostly instrumental to their political objectives.

While the divergent attitudes of some Lozi elites can therefore be generally accounted for within the framework of the theory put forward in this paper, one puzzle remains: why do Lozi commoners also appear to embrace
Zambia since its reproduction seems to have come at a great cost to their province? According to a survey conducted by Daniel Posner in 1996, 74% of local respondents considered themselves Zambians before being Lozi.13 Also, Aka's Agenda for Zambia failed to win any seats in the Western Province in the 1999 national elections, despite support from the Barotse Patriotic Front and the Barotse Cultural Association. Fear of repression may be part of the answer. In the 1960s and 1970s, Lozi activists, including indunas, were frequently put in jail. Nowadays too, some fear retaliation if they speak against Zambia or the BRE. According to a former induna, "there could be retaliation. People's business interests could be threatened. One would be denounced by the litunga to the central government as anti-government" (anonymous former induna interview, 2003). The harassment of the BPF's Mutangelwa provide support for these fears. The prevailing poverty in the Western province, as well as the dependence of the few Lozi businesses on government contracts, may well reinforce cultural inhibitions. Another possibility is that Lozi citizens are well aware of the constraints in which they live, and particularly of the limited likelihood that a separatist Barotseland would ever be internationally recognized and acquire the resources of sovereignty. Since, like many other Africans, the Lozis expect the state to deliver the benefits of development, it would be irrational for them to challenge or alienate the latter without a credible alternative, whatever the extent of their grievances and alienation. The resulting outcome is what development economists refer to as a "low-level equilibrium trap," a situation of poverty that is self-reinforcing.

There is no lack of grievance in Barotseland. Yet, a complex national logic, based largely on the local use by the Barotse elite of some benefits of state sovereignty, trumps the political expression of regional particularism. For the BRE, it makes sense to avoid responsibility for public policy while continuing to accrue benefits from a traditional status recognized and reproduced by the state. For grass-root residents of the Western Province, it may also make sense not to challenge a state which still monopolizes the provision of development to their region. In the next section, I show how similar circumstances and rationales lead to an opposite outcome in Casamance.

Casamance

The position of political elites in Casamance contrasts greatly with Barotseland. There is, as mentioned earlier, no tradition of centralized rule in

13 Daniel N. Posner, "Zambian Political Attitudes Questionnaire," 1996. Methodological details of this survey are presented in Appendix B of Posner (2005). Although Posner's sample was small, the numbers are so distant from 50% as to allow us to take his findings as representing a significant trend.
Casamance (Péllissier 1966; Darbon 1988) and very little hierarchy in political relations altogether, even at the local level, where the „main authority figures are the patriarchs” who „do not control access to land or labor” but act instead as „intermediaries for the spirit shrines that are the centerpiece in customary modes of regulating land, agricultural production, social life, and community space” (Boone 2003:101). Casamance separatist leaders are not therefore local authority figures pushing for cultural recognition. They are, by and large, modernized (educated) would-be elites who have been kept off local positions of administrative authority by Dakar’s policy of direct rule in the region, itself the consequence of its difficulties in co-opting an acephalous society into its elite-fusion system of rule.

As Boone (2003:94) laments, the Senegalese state was unable to apply its fusion-of-elites policy in Casamance, despite its successes in the Wolof groundnut basin, because, „[h]ere, the Dakar regime found no rural leaders with whom to broker a stable and secure political alliance” because of the lack of local hierarchical social organization. Indeed, among the Diola, „there are no castes, no monarchies or aristocracies, and no hierarchical or bureaucratic state structures” (Boone 2003:96). As a result, Senegal applied a quasi-colonial strategy of direct rule and „administrative occupation,” appointing non-local civil servants and administrators, including governors from the Senegalese military, and posting educated Casamançais cadres outside their region of origin. Furthermore, the few Diola „big men” who were appointed to the national government, lacked local roots. In the words of a local lawyer, „Casamançais found that their cultural differences translated in ostracism from state management” (Badji interview, 2002).

The consequences of this policy would be far reaching, as it essentially deprived rising modern Casamance elites from access to the material benefits of sovereignty. Quoting again from Boone’s excellent work, the problem of local Casamance elites became that they had „few points of access to administrative and patronage resources” (2003:117). In an environment of poverty where economic activity is largely monopolized by the state, obtaining administrative offices is the path to social advancement and the attendant opportunities for exploitation and accumulation. This is especially true where local elites do not control access to land and labor, as in Casamance, and become even more dependent upon the control of administrative offices. Without such opportunities, rebellion is a rational strategy, either to create one’s own sovereignty or to shape an identifiable local political elite for the government to work with and extend sovereignty benefits. From this perspective, then, the Casamance war of secession is as much about the formation of a local dominant political class as it is about the assertion of cultural identity.

A closer look at the MFDC leadership illustrates this argument. Unlike the BRF, it is non-customary and does not belong to an organized, and much less centralized, „traditional” power structure. In general, MFDC leaders are
modernized rising elites, whose social status is frequently a function of their education or migration experience (Foucher 2002) and who have relatively tenuous links with their region. This seems to have been true from the very beginnings of the movement in 1947 when founders Emile Badiane and Ibou Diallo, who were school teachers, set up the party with 121 „literate notables” (Boone 2003:112) in search of their region’s „disenclavement,” or integration into Senegal. Although the MFDC’s formal agenda has since changed, the nature of its leadership seems to have endured. Of the five top leaders of the movement (Sidy Badji, Salif Diallo, Mamadou Nkrumah Sane, Léopold Sagna, and Diamacoune Senghor), four spent a considerable part of their life away from Casamance and acquired social status through education or military careers.14 Badji fought with the French army in Indochina, Algeria and Morocco, then worked in Dakar as a driver before returning to Casamance. Diamacoune was ordained priest in 1956 (and by joining the Church also joined the strongest social hierarchy in Casamance), then went to study theology in Belgium, before returning to Ziguinchor and becoming active as a teacher and youth organizer. Sagna was a soldier and quit the Senegalese army in 1980 with corporal ranking. As for Nkrumah Sane, he left Senegal in 1964 to live successively in Egypt, Morocco and France (where he participated in the May 1968 student revolt) before returning to Ziguinchor in 1975. He returned to France in 1991 after helping negotiate a cease fire and still lives there.15 Only Salif Sadio (who is younger) is truly a local and with less education than the others as he left school in 1985 after being recruited to join Atika.

Why should these leaders have decided to start fighting for the secession of Casamance? For sure, they are not local notables pushing for cultural recognition. Rather, it appears that their separatist demands came from their desire to rise as local political elites and to take control of the local domestic appendages of international sovereignty, with or without Senegal. It may be hard to impute such motives „ex post” to these leaders but, at the very least, the evolution of the conflict suggests that, in the end, Casamançais separatism has been more about state-derived class formation within Casamance than about subnational assertion.

Other authors have already pointed out the fact that the Casamance conflict is more about association than separatism. Gasser (2002) suggests that the MFDC’s objective is to seek a better integration with Senegal rather than withdrawing from it. Humphreys and Mohamed (2003) have called the struggle one for association to nation building, with separatism as a strategy of

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14 I owe all MFDC biographical information to the knowledge and generosity of Vincent Foucher.

15 Three of these leaders (Badji, Sadio and Sane) are also Muslim, which should temper claims that Casamance separatism is about religious polarization with the rest of Senegal.
negotiation. My argument builds on these, but goes further: MFDC elites are not only trying to negotiate their integration into Senegal, but more so their local hegemony within Senegal. As mentioned earlier, there is a traditional vacuum of political hegemony in Casamance, by virtue of its highly decentralized political culture. Before the conflict, there was not either a strong entrepreneurial class, as the business sector (mostly tourism) was largely in the hands of French operators.16 As a result, social promotion had largely been defined, since the end period of colonialism, through education and access to civil service, in what Foucher (2002:308) labels a "social compact between the state and Casamance." As the state descended into a deep fiscal crisis in the late 1970s, however, this compact fell apart and modernized Casamançais elites were left struggling for access. With opportunities for employment within the state ever more remote, the desire to invest local public institutions may have grown. But the historical strategy of administrative occupation by Senegal deprived Casamançais of local access too. In this perspective, separatist warfare provided a rational means to either secure local sovereign institutions, if successful, or at least violently revoke Dakar's direct rule and promote the rise of local institutions with their attendant opportunities for political, social and economic advancement.

Although this claim is mostly at the level of analytical speculation, patterns of behavior by MFDC elites are consistent with it. For one, the independentist nature of the MFDC demands has considerably eroded over the years. By 1999, at its Banjul Congress, the MFDC program no longer called for independence. Instead, it asked for regional institutions of which local elites would be in charge. Specifically, after demanding that the Senegalese Constitution recognize the existence of a people, a culture and a territory of Casamance, which MFDC leaders need as a nationalist foundation for their institutional demands, the Banjul platform called for the establishment of a local government, parliament, judicial system and "all other institutions necessary to govern Casamance."

Second, Humphreys and Mohamed (2003) found no evidence of the MFDC having built institutions in liberated territories, as one would expect from a separatist movement. This is consistent with the idea that the MFDC does not truly wish to challenge the state with its own institutions, but prefers access to state-sanctioned ones.17

16 E-mail communication from Vincent Foucher. 28 April 2004.
17 See Tull (2003) for a similar argument about the RCD-Goma in Congo's Kivu region. Humphreys and Mohamed (2003) also note little evidence of a developed sense of nationalism in Casamance, which parallels the evidence from Barotseland and tones down the subnational hypothesis. In fact, they stress that President Wade claimed that the massive acceptance of the new Constitution by referendum in January 2001 in Casamance was an endorsement of its place in the Senegalese state.
Finally, and most interestingly, the Senegalese state actually provides financial transfers to MFDC leaders who stop fighting or abandon separatist claims. For example, under Abdou Diouf, the state provided payments to the Northern Front and to the political wing in Ziguinchor (Foucher 2003:103). This may appear at first as a simple case of co-option, but there is more to it than that. MFDC leaders use these transfers to reinforce their local power. By having access to state resources and redistributing them, they make the case for their legitimacy and potential as local elites. Lacking other social foundations, they establish their local political hegemony by demonstrating their counterpart status to the state. They acquired this status by fighting, then negotiating the terms of their renunciation to violence. Foucher (2003:111) indicates what a crucial dimension of the local struggle this represents when he mentions how Diamacoune complained to Wade in October 2001 that he was no longer receiving state subsidies while having „important [local] charges.” Separatist posturing becomes an equilibrium here, as it guarantees the flow of resources which enhance the separatists’ local control. Credibility as a local patron is thus derived from a recognition by Dakar of one’s status as separatist leader willing to compromise. The conflict becomes a credible way for would-be local elites to achieve elite status and benefit from sovereignty (though the transfers must represent at best a temporary reward on the way to greater regional institutional autonomy).

While the separatist objective is rational for educated people who need access to state employment, Casamançais who are independently wealthy, belong to the private sector, or whose careers do not depend on administrative employment, tend to oppose it for it does not favor their material interests. Hence, the creation in 1998 of a „Collectif des Cadres Casamançais” by a wealthy architect from the region but living in Dakar, Pierre Atepa Goudiaby. The „Collectif” is a grouping of entrepreneurs or professionals from Casamance, most of whom live in Dakar, wishing to express an alternative view to the MFDC. According to Goudiaby, who now also serves as adviser to President Wade on Casamance, he and the members of his associations were suffering from suspicions by the state that they were local cadres of the MFDC. They set up the „Collectif” in part to take a public stance against independence (Goudiaby interview, 2002). This is also a rational position for these people as their business interests suffer from the conflict. Because they have chosen private paths to economic and social advancement, they have no use for separate institutional development in Casamance and stand to gain instead from signaling their loyalty to the state whose national base in Dakar they tend to share.

While it is rational for these cadres to denounce the separatist agenda, it is equally rational for MFDC bush fighters (the „Maquisards”) to reject the compromises of their civilian leadership and continue to fight, which has led in part to the prevailing difficulties for the government in negotiating an end
to the war. For civilian elites, access to the benefits of sovereignty is the goal. This eventually requires some level of compromise with the central state. For the military wing, however, the war allows for substantial amounts of smuggling and other uncaptured commercial and agricultural activities (Evans 2000, Foucher 2003), which make its continuation optimal. This is especially true as most of the estimated 2,000-4,000 remaining „maquisards” are composed of school drop-outs and „opportunistic elements” engaged in banditry and smuggling under the cover of the rebellion, and who would have few employment options in a Casamance administration (Evans 2000:653, Rochester interview, 2002; Ndongo interview, 2002). Both fighters and civilians follow the same resource logic but make different decisions as a function of the constraints and opportunities they face. This resource logic accounts therefore in part for the MFDC’s factionalism.

In conclusion, MFDC leaders want their region’s autonomy in order to reach positions of administrative authority and political hegemony within a sovereign state, and the material benefits that come with them. This argument differs from the idea of neo-patrimonial redistribution of resources, which underwrites the notion of reciprocal assimilation of elites (Bayart 1993, Boone 2003), to the extent that it is about buying local elites’ allegiance by allowing them to dominate or exploit their own populations, rather than by sharing state spoils with them. One should therefore be suspicious of nationalist/cultural arguments in explaining Casamance separatism. Although local grievances do exist, they are not a sufficient condition for separatist conflict until they get instrumentalized by elites. Thus, the idea that the Casamance conflict is about setting up a „Gabou Confederation” among the Diola of Casamance, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau only prevails among a minority of local actors, such as possibly Nkrumah Sane whose life in the diaspora may have contributed to a „purity of exile” view of the conflict (Beck 1999; Marut 1999).

When deprived of the benefits of sovereignty, as in Casamance, local elites will challenge national integration so as to renegotiate the terms of their access to statehood. When the benefits of sovereignty can be enjoyed within the postcolonial context, as in Barotseland, local elites will comply with national integration. The one difference between Barotseland and Casamance—political culture—turns out to be a determinant factor, albeit indirectly. Even though the elites of both regions are bypassed by administrators imposed from the center, the BRE can still capitalize on some of the local benefits of sovereignty while the modernized elites of Casamance need access to administrative positions in order to do well.
Conclusions and implications for state resilience in Africa

This paper began by acknowledging the puzzling extent to which African states have avoided significant territorial reconfiguration since their independence. This final section reviews the contributions and shortcomings of existing theories on this question and suggests how the evidence from Barotseland and Casamance may lead to a better understanding of the effects of postcolonial sovereignty on the reproduction of states in Africa.

Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg already asked in 1982 "Why Africa's Weak States Persist." They focused on international dynamics, suggesting that the granting of "juridical statehood" by the international community to former colonial entities allowed their reproduction despite their empirical shortcomings, because it froze African states in their inherited colonial jurisdictions and impeded self-determination movements. Their argument was about the resistance of the African juridical state, thanks to its international legitimacy, against domestic challenges. What they did not explain (or identify), however, was the relative lack of such challenges to the state. Although they pointed to a relationship between juridical statehood and continued poverty, they did not explain why Africans do not reject the poverty, chaos and institutional weakness perpetuated by juridical statehood. How do international norms of recognition of sovereignty translate into the actions of Africans, especially those excluded from power?

William Reno (2001) too shows that international sovereignty matters. Reno focuses on the strategies of rulers of weak states who capitalize on their sovereign status to embark on transactions with international firms for their own benefit. Firms play the game because the rulers' sovereign status offers them some guarantees. For rulers, the weakened sovereign state offers new opportunities which, paradoxically, compensate for their loss of internal control. As a consequence, although "a new internal configuration of power" arises "in place of formal state bureaucracies" (198), the state itself endures as its sovereign status is a necessary condition of this system. While national leaders no longer care about controlling some parts of their territory, their states continue to exist because the international system reproduces their sovereign status even without effective control.

While doubtless accurate and enlightening, Reno's theory does not focus on the "domestic" dimensions of international sovereignty for local elites. It stresses the capacity of rulers to resist and reconfigure their power, and it argues that rebel leaders, attracted by the resources of sovereignty derived from international contracts, will fight to wrestle control of the state away from the ruler rather than secede:

Apparently international recognition of sovereignty offers material and political advantages to insurgents that exceed the resources that come with "de
"facto" control over a specific territory. It is not surprising in this light that no major post-Cold War insurgency group, even in Africa's weakest states, has articulated an irredentist or separatist agenda that challenges Africa's boundaries inherited from colonial rule (203).

Reno's theory does not address, however, why local leaders, especially those not associated with sharing the resources of sovereignty derived from international contracts, as in Barotseland, so frequently embrace the state? And it does not explain why separatism does sometimes happen, as in Casamance, where rebels seem more intent on having autonomous institutions than on taking over power in Dakar (the MFDC has never taken its armed struggle outside of Casamance).

A third and final argument highlights the depth and territorial specificity of nationalist feelings generated in Africa over the last 40 years and through the colonial episode. According to Crawford Young (2002), African nationalism originates in the shared experience of "common colonial subjugation." For this reason, he contends, there has been no real confrontation between territorial nationalism and political ethnicity. Furthermore, the affective ties of territorial nationalism appear impervious to negative popular perceptions of the state and have so far shielded states torn by civil strife or prolonged economic crises from disintegrating completely. While much is appealing about Young's argument, the origins of postcolonial territorial nationalism remain unclear, especially in a region like Barotseland, where much of the colonial episode was lived distinctly from the rest of Northern Rhodesia and where the remnants of kingdom could make a strong appeal for subnationalism. Young's argument does not either account for the exclusive character of some of Africa's nationalisms, such as "Ivoirité", which purports to exclude large segment of Ivorians from the benefits of belonging to the state (Banégas and Losch 2002). Finally, it does not explain the few instances of separatist conflict, as in Senegal.

The comparison between Barotseland and Casamance offers a possibility to refine the sovereignty hypothesis developed by Jackson and Rosberg (1982) in the diplomatic sphere and by Reno (2001) in the commercial and military ones. It highlights the benefits of state sovereignty for "local" elites and state agents, in "domestic" social relations as well as towards foreign states and companies. First of all, local elites want access to state sovereignty in order to partake in the benefits of foreign aid and investments. As a result, their decision to comply with national integration will depend on whether they can get such access through existing political structures. Even though little redistribution of state resources accrues to the Barotse Royal Establishment or their region, they do benefit from some liberty to capitalize for themselves on the trappings of sovereignty (such as acting as intermediaries in the distribution of food aid in the Western Province, or negotiating with foreign companies for the management of national parks). In Casamance, in contrast, local lead-
ers have been systematically denied access to state structures and have been unable to act as intermediaries with foreign financial flows, making it more appealing for them to fight for their own sovereignty.

Second, and most important, local elites want access to sovereign state institutions in order to better establish their hegemony over local populations. Association with the sovereign state provides for cheap avenues of control, predation and exploitation, with few demands for actual use of force. In Barotseland, the recognition of the Barotseland Agreement by Lusaka would provide an ideal outcome in terms of state sanction of local hegemony for the Bartose Royal Establishment. Short of that, the kingship continues to benefit locally from the tacit recognition by the state of its powers over land and natural resources, which allows the litunga to use regional assets, such as timber, in apparently private business deals. In Casamance, on the other hand, what Boone (2003) labels the „administrative occupation“ of the region by the Senegalese state has deprived local elites of the domestic benefits of occupying local positions of authority. As a result, they have demanded independence. When it became clearer, after the French arbitrarion of 1993, that this would not be an option, demands evolved towards local autonomy, which would equally empower local elites with the instruments of sovereignty.

To some extent, analytical statements about the empirical weakness of the African state have been exaggerated. The authority of state agencies to issue (however arbitrary) regulations and make extractive demands, and their power to enforce them, are very rarely challenged, even at the local level. There is weakness of state performance, but not of state „command,“ to borrow from Mbembe’s (2000) lexicon. This residual capacity of the weak state, magnified in fact by the very weakness of mechanisms of accountability, promotes its continued appeal for many local elites and would-be elites, as well as for lower-ranking agents of the state and those whose livelihood depend on them.

Sovereignty is the ingredient that makes such authority and power possible without systematic recourse to the use of force. Evidence of the external legitimacy of the state—Jackson and Rosberg’s „juridical statehood“—is a domestic as much as an international resource, for it contributes to the effective authority and power of its institutions at the domestic level. Sovereignty is the gold standard that guarantees the convertibility of state institutions into credible instruments of domination, extraction and predation at the local level, and makes such institutions so appealing to rulers and opponents alike, uniting them in their embrace of the state while pitting them against each other in their competition for it.

In reality, Casamance and Barotseland leaders have few credible choices in terms of self-determination. Because the principle of post-colonial recognition determines the parameters upon which sovereignty can be acquired in
Africa (Herbst 2000), they would stand little chance of recognition were they actually to go their separate ways, unless they could claim post-colonial status on their own, which both tried and failed to establish. Elsewhere in the world, low odds of recognition do not necessarily prevent separatists from launching their struggle for self-determination, as suggested by sustained secessionist conflicts by the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Aceh in Indonesia, or Chechnia in Russia. In Africa’s specific environment, however, the power and economic payoffs of sovereignty are magnified because poverty is widespread, there exist few other options than the state for material accumulation, and economies are largely dependent on primary commodities whose revenue streams also depend on foreign investments and frequently accrue in the form of fees, taxes or royalties, putting a premium on control of the sovereign state. Consequently, separatism is not a sustainable strategy in Africa in the absence of rapid formal recognition, unless rebels can rely on the support of diasporas or of international trade networks independent from the state, as in Somalia (Reno 2003). Only when deprived of access to local agencies of the state or of a credible chance to share power at the center will local elites embark on the violent pursuit of autonomy, as in Casamance. This analysis suggests that an understanding of African politics along communal or ethnic lines, while useful, is nevertheless limited, and that an element of class analysis, which factors in the hegemonic pursuits of each group’s elites over their own people (rather than the overall group’s alleged grievances vis-à-vis the state), may provide additional explanatory power.

The study of marginal or peripheral groups, such as Barotseland and Casamance, highlights the unusual dynamics of African state formation, as their eventual compliance with national integration contrasts with expectations based on their cultural specificities and grievances. These groups are particularly interesting because they are at the margin of the prebendal system of power and, hence, are first to suffer from the fiscal contraction and failure of the central state apparatus. What makes these groups continue to comply with the state illustrates the pervasive appeal of weak sovereign statehood, even for apparent losers, and carries the argument beyond the fusion of elites in which these groups typically do not partake. To some extent, the weakening of many African states after 1990, while it led to the collapse of established neopatrimonial alliances and a consequent rise in political violence, has also made the state more appealing for local elites and bureaucrats by loosening the center’s control on the use and appropriation of state institutions. Hence, the number of groups who have a vested interest in the preservation of the state may well increase as state capacity decreases. Despite Young’s (2004) claims, then, the post-colonial state, while weaker than ever, is also more resilient than ever because its very weakness guarantees new possibilities for the appropriation of the resources of sovereignty. In the end, national integration is both a failure and a success in Africa: a failure for
having produced numerous dysfunctional states; a success for having secured the compliance of many of its victims.

References

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Schlüsselwörter:
Elite, Separatismus, Autonomie, Staatsbildung, Senegal, Sambia, Casamance, Barotseland
Résumé
Pourquoi certaines régions périphériques d’Afrique acceptent-elles leur intégration à l’État post-colonial et d’autres pas? Pourquoi certaines élites régionales, hors la „fusion des élites” qui sous-tend l’État africain, embrassent-elles cet État alors que d’autres le rejettent? Cet article suggère quelques éléments de réponse à ces questions, basés sur l’expérience du Barotseland, où les élites lozis ont largement choisi de ne pas s’opposer au projet zambien, et de la Casamance, où les particularismes locaux ont produit une défiance séparatiste parmi les Diolas à l’égard de l’État sénégalais. L’article montre que le contraste entre Barotseland et Casamance est plus tactique que substantiel, et que, dans les deux cas, les élites régionales s’efforcent d’avoir accès aux bénéfices locaux de la souveraineté. Si elles sont en mesure d’utiliser les instruments de l’État dans leurs stratégies locales de domination et d’accès aux ressources, il est peu probable que ces élites choisissent de le défier, quand bien même elles sont privées de ses bénéfices au niveau national. Elles se battront, toutefois, pour plus d’autonomie si elles manquent de moyens institutionnels de réaliser leur projet hégémonique local. L’article souligne ainsi le besoin d’un nouveau modèle de la reproduction de l’État en Afrique qui tienne compte des bénéfices de la souveraineté pour les élites locales afin d’expliquer l’acquiescence au projet post-colonial des exclus de la „fusion des élites.”

Mots clés
élite, séparatisme, autonomie, formation de l’État, Sénégal, Zambie

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